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Reining in Provincial Fiscal ‘O w ners’:
Decentralization in Lao PDR
Juan Luis G om ez, Jorge M artinez-V azquez and
Cristian S ep u lved a 1

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
The People’s Democratic Republic o f Lao (Lao PDR), landlocked between
Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, China, and Vietnam in the core o f
Southeast Asia, accounts for a population o f some six million over a total
surface o f 236,800 square kilometers. Latest estimates would place poverty
rates at around 33 percent o f households (ADB, 2002). With an estimated
per capita income o f $500 in 2006 (World Bank, 2006), Lao PDR stands
among the poorest countries in Asia. Inequality, measured by an estimated
Gini coefficient o f some 0.36 (UNDP, 2004) is high for such a low level o f
income.2 Lao’s set o f basic human development indicators rank the country
133 out of 177 states in the Human Development Index (UNDP, 2007).
Recent economic growth is reportedly high, with an annual average rate
o f over 6 percent between 2001 and 2006, mostly fuelled by the expansion
o f the resource sector (IMF, 2007). Agriculture accounts for the largest
share o f the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), while mineral exports and
investments in hydro-power have recently been the most important engines
o f growth. Reform o f State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) remains allegedly
timid and a number o f measures have been recommended to encourage the
development of a nascent private sector (World Bank, 2005).’
Despite the macroeconomic stability experienced in recent times, serious
concerns have been raised over the country’s weak fiscal position, with
upward pressures on the wage bill and the presence of large government
expenditure arrears (World Bank, 2005). Lao PDR reports a ratio of
revenues over GDP o f around 11 percent, one o f the lowest among
developing countries (IMF, 2006). A fourth of the real growth in fiscal
revenues over the last few years is accounted for by the expanding energy
sector, the tax revenues o f which accure to the central government, a
187
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situation that contrasts with decreased revenue collections at the provincial
level.
Success in regaining a solid fiscal footing, especially in the areas of
improved revenue collection and conservative public service hiring policies,
remains largely the responsibility o f subnational levels o f government.4
Almost 40 percent o f all national expenditure on basic social services is
conducted at the subnational level (W orld Bank, 2007), although in light of
Lao PDR developmental needs, resources available may still not suffice to
meet subnational expenditure needs for social services and infrastructure. In
this chapter we make the case that structural deficiencies in the system o f
inter-governmental fiscal relations may be as important a constraint for the
sustainable development o f the country as the overall lack o f resources and
pose substantial barriers for effective reform.
Back and Forth: A Brief History of Decentralization Patterns in
Lao PDR
Decentralization policy has for many years played a central role in different
Lao PDR attempts to reform its public sector (see Box 6.1 for a chronology
o f the main landmarks.) Following Vaillancourt (2001) and UNCDF (2002),
the Lao history o f central-local relations can be divided into four welldefined periods and described as a recurrent pattern o f decentralization and
re-centralization. The first period, from 1975 (year o f the establishment of
the Lao PDR) to 1986 was characterized by the coexistence o f a significant
level o f autonomy allocated to provinces, and a centrally-planned economy.
Despite the autonomy granted, provinces were largely dependent on
transfers from the central government during the period.
With the implementation o f the New Economic Mechanism in 1986, the
autonomy enjoyed by provinces increased further. The provincial
administration in general was endowed with most of the planning and
budgeting responsibilities, and the provincial governors in particular with
authority over the provincial and district tax offices (Keeulers and
Siboungeuang, 1999). In a move that has proven to have important fiscal
consequences, provincial governors obtained management responsibility
over provincial civil servants, including wage and hiring policies
(Vaillancourt, 2001). As Keeulers and Siboungeuang (1999) note,
devolution in Lao PDR reached a point where provinces were able to set
interest rates and exchange rates for the local currency, for a period o f time
effectively dismantling the central state banking system.
Unsustainable fiscal imbalances and the intrinsic macroeconomic
instability derived from this system prompted a first drive towards the re
centralization o f expenditure and revenue responsibilities in 1991, explicitly
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Figure 6.1 Lao People's Democratic Republic, Map No. 3959 Rev.2,
January 2004
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reflected in the new Constitution of 1991, and the 1994 Budget Law and
that continued during most o f the 1990s. 5
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Box 6.1 A chronology o f decentralization in Lao PDR
1975

•
•
•

1986

•
•
•

•
•

Proclamation of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic
Considerable independence granted to the provinces despite the
implementation o f the centralized state.
Provinces largely dependent on transfers from the central
government
Adoption of the New Economic Mechanism
Accelerated fiscal and administrative devolution to the provinces.
Provinces come under the responsibility of the Provincial
Governor. Links with the central tax office and line Ministries are
severed.
Each government tier replicated the same tax instruments at each
level.
Provinces determined their own interest and exchange rates.

1991

•
•

Fifth Party Congress Resolution on re-centralization
New Constitution is approved re-stating the unitary nature of the
state.

1992

•

First consolidated National Budget is approved since 1975.
Included both central and local government expenditures.

1994

•
•

New budget law approved.
Established the principles of State Budget formulation.

2000

New wave of decentralization.
•
Instruction 01/PM. Defined the province as the strategic unit
(focus on planning activities) and the district as the budget
execution unit.
•
Decree 192/PM on the Implementation of the Budget Law
•
Instruction 475, defined revenue sources by levels of
government.
•
Instruction 128, detailed planning responsibilities at each level of
government.

2007

•

New Budget Law. Orders the centralization of Treasury, Customs
and Tax Administration functions.

2008

•

National Budget Law Implementation Decree

The fourth and last stage of the decentralization process started in the early
2000s. The new decade witnessed initially a rebirth o f the decentralization
impetus, with the approval o f Decree 01 /PM and 192/PM on the
Implementation o f the Budget Law. In particular, Decree 01/PM had the
main objective o f defining the province as the strategic unit (focus on
planning activities) and the district as the budget execution unit
(Vaillancourt, 2001). Both decrees are supported by Instruction
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Note/Recommendation 475, defining revenue sources by levels o f
government, and Instruction Note/Recommendation 128, detailing planning
responsibilities at each level o f government.
Given the central importance o f the power granted to governors in the
system, both in the diagnostic o f the problems now faced by Lao PDR in the
area o f decentralization and the options available to move the system
forward, it is quite critical to understand why this institution (of all
powerful governors) came about in the system in the first place and why it
has endured over time. It would appear that a highly de-concentrated system
run by provincial governors has roots in the war o f independence efforts,6
and also in the fragmented geography o f the country. Some authors however
place the origins o f this institutional inertia of provincial autonomy in the
ancient organization o f countries in district-like units called meuangs. The
meuangs were ruled by aristocratic families that, although officially pledged
alliance to the royalty, enjoyed considerable discretion in local affairs
(Stuart-Fox, 2005).
On the other hand, even though many o f the governors are ranking
members o f the Politburo and seem to enjoy substantial discretion in their
operations, in more recent times they have been far from immune to central
government action. In fact, of the cohort o f governors appointed or re
appointed by the President at the V Party Congress o f 2006, few remain in
office by the end o f their terms, with the rest being removed at different
points allegedly for reasons having to do with provincial finances.7 But, in
any case, the governors are accountable ultimately to the Revolutionary
Party and not to the populations they are meant to serve.
The current system seems to respond to the ingrained belief among the
top authorities o f the country that the current arrangement is the best way to
govern it, either because o f historical developments or the geographic and
ethnic diversity o f the country. However, as we will examine below, it is
highly unlikely that the decentralization reform agenda of the Lao PDR will
be able to move forward without finding a way to reign in the power and
discretion now exercised by the provincial governors. At the same time, the
process will require strengthening central government institutions,
especially the Ministry o f Finance, by controlling revenue collections (the
apparatus o f tax administration and Customs) and expenditures (the
Treasury system o f budget execution). Although it may seem a bit
paradoxical, one o f the most important lessons from the international
experience with decentralization for the Lao PDR is that an effective system
o f decentralized governance will require a significantly stronger central
government in key areas o f the budget process.
This assessment, shared by many international observers, seems to have
ushered in the consideration of reforms conducive to the re-centralization of
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the critical functions o f Treasury and Tax Administration, currently under
the control o f provincial governors. This new change in the course o f the
reform o f central-provincial fiscal relations has been formally sanctioned in
a new Budget Law in place since 2007. It is early to evaluate the results of
these recent policy developments. Although we would argue that the
principles and direction o f reform seem correct, reforms are still very much
in the drawing board and it is unclear whether political agreement is
widespread in the Government and Party. The continued swings in the
direction o f reform of intergovernmental fiscal relations are a very specific
characteristic of the decentralization process in Lao PDR. One would be
hard-pressed to find another country where drives towards both
decentralization and re-centralization o f fiscal authority have alternated so
widely over such a short period o f time. In the background and as origin of
these reforms, we should consider the balancing o f political power between
center and provinces rather than responses to the self-expressed needs o f
citizens.

BA R R IE R S TO DECENTRALIZATION DESIGN: A
MODEL OF EX T REM E DE-CONCENTRATION
The Current Vertical Structure of Government
The Constitution o f the People’s Democratic Republic o f Lao, in its Article
75 (amended in 2003), states the republic is divided into four levels o f
administration. There are currently 18 provinces,8 sub-divided in turn into
141 districts and municipalities (of equal jurisdictional hierarchy), and
11,293 villages.9 The Law on Local Administrations defines, in its Article
59, two levels o f budget for subnational finance, the province and the
district. The village is defined as the basic revenue collection unit, with its
expenditure tasks to be defined by the district.
Provinces and cities are ruled by governors, while districts are governed
by mayors and municipalities and villages by chiefs. Importantly, there are
no provincial legislative organs, in the way o f the locally elected
assemblies. Provincial governors are appointed by the President upon the
Prime M inister’s recommendation for a five year period (Article 16 Law on
Local Administrations). The country’s multi-ethnic dimension is somewhat
reflected in policy design, as the means o f maintaining national cohesion.
For example, the provincial governor or deputy governor is routinely a
member o f the majority ethnic group o f the province.
The organizational structure o f the provincial administrations (Article 8
o f the Law on Local Administrations), includes the provincial cabinet and
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the local, de-concentrated divisions of the line Ministries. The same
structure is replicated at the district level. Although Article 10 o f the Law
on Local Administrations establishes a principle of dual accountability of
local divisions o f line Ministries to the provincial administration and
national Ministry, in practice it is the governor that exercises control over
the provinces’ personnel.10 This practice is also sanctioned in the legislation
since Article 14.12-14 establishes the governor’s capacity to “propose the
appointment, transfer or removal of chiefs o f districts and municipalities,”
to “appoint the directors o f the local divisions of the line ministries,” and to
“appoint, transfer, or remove the chief and deputy chief o f the provincial or
city cabinet.”
A Decentralized Vertical Structure of Government:
Necessary Conditions
An efficient system o f fiscal decentralization requires the existence of
elected local councils at all levels o f government (Bahl, 1999). Otherwise
the self-expressed preferences o f local citizens over the mix o f public goods
and services are unlikely to be channeled into expenditure and tax policies.
In addition, local officers must also be appointed locally and be accountable
to the elected authorities.
States confront two main choices in the definition o f their vertical
structures o f government. An alternative is to define a hierarchical structure
where subnational governments are “creatures” of and accountable to their
immediately higher level o f government. Conversely, a “bi-fijrcated”
system o f government would include at least two levels o f subnational
governments, each o f them directly accountable to the central level.
In principle, either model would allow reaping the potential efficiency
gains from a decentralized system o f government. However, hierarchical
systems o f government may present greater challenges in the monitoring of
subnational inter-governmental fiscal relations. A close monitoring o f inter
governmental fiscal relations is particularly important in the absence o f
effective accountability mechanisms to control the behavior o f subnational
authorities, and when the responsibilities of subnational governments have
not been clearly defined. In Vietnam for instance, provinces were allocated
in the new State Budget Law o f 2002 full responsibility over the definition
o f the expenditure and revenue responsibilities o f district and commune
level governments. This has resulted in a wide array o f intra-provincial
expenditure and revenue assignments. The lack of uniformity in the
application o f general principles for fiscal decentralization may result in
perverse incentives for provinces to exercise excessive fiscal control over
districts and communes. As it happens, districts and communes provide an
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important number of public services over which they would require
adequate autonomy and funding.
It is thus important that, even if hierarchical designs o f vertical
structures o f government are favored, the expenditure and revenue
assignments o f each level o f government, as well as the transfer
mechanisms required to finance expenditures at the local level, are defined
formally in the relevant legal documents (i.e., Budget Law, Organic Laws
o f subnational governments, etc.)
Bi-furcated systems in turn, due to their nature, present potential
problems o f coordination among the different levels o f government. From
that point o f view, it is especially important that the institutional
mechanisms are in place in order to resolve administrative conflicts
regarding expenditure and revenue raising responsibilities. Eventually, last
resort to the highest judiciary institution (e.g. the Supreme Court) may be
required in this type o f administrative conflicts, but as mentioned, this need
be a last resort option once all administrative conflict resolution channels
are exhausted.
Barriers from the Current Vertical Structure of Government to
Efficient Decentralization in Lao PDR
Conventionally, a structure o f de-concentrated government at the
subnational level provides a good basis for evolving a fiscal system towards
a more genuine decentralized structure. In Lao PDR, paradoxically, the
current de-concentrated structure may represent one of the most important
limitations to efficient decentralization.
First, in order to capitalize on the potential advantages o f fiscal
decentralization, provincial and district representative assemblies, with
popular representation and with power to approve their respective
subnational budgets are required. Providing autonomous legal standing to
subnational units would not go against the unitary system o f government in
Lao PDR, but the current structure o f vertical government would not allow
for such a reform without a significant overhaul o f the system.
Second, there needs to be a careful assessment o f whether there are
currently too many levels o f subnational administration and whether some
o f the subnational units are too small to operate efficiently in a
decentralized system o f governance. It would appear from the current
vantage point that three levels o f budget determination (central, provincial
and district) does not seem excessive for a country of Lao PDR size and
geographic characteristics." On the issue o f size, there are perhaps real
gains in efficiency to be realized by the consolidation o f provinces or
districts into a smaller number o f jurisdictions. We must note, however, that
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the “optimal” size o f subnational units must not be considered exclusively
along the lines o f economies o f scale or efficiency but also along other
dimensions, including access o f citizens to government units and eventually
the accountability o f local officials to the residents in those communities. In
addition, provinces may be better suited to accommodate ethnic territorial
divisions. From that point o f view, inter-municipal or inter-provincial
cooperation may allow access to the available economies o f scale without
surrendering political representation. In short, the current level of
fragmentation o f subnational governments would not seem to pose serious
limitations to a transition towards an efficient system o f fiscal
decentralization.
Expenditure Assignments
Provincial administrations play a critical role in the current Lao vertical
structure o f government. The provincial administrations are assigned in the
Law on Local Administration the general responsibilities to manage
political, economic and socio-cultural affairs, and human resources; and to
protect, preserve and utilize natural resources and the environment.
Provinces are also entrusted to manage national and local defense and
security and foreign affairs as assigned by the central government.
As a prior point to the discussion o f expenditure assignments, it is
important to underline the current pervasive role o f the state in the economy
in Lao PDR, which in itself is preventing an adequate assignment of
responsibilities to the different levels of government. The constraints here
are twofold. First, the state still has important presence, as is the case in
other Communist countries, in productive industries where its performance
is generally not as efficient as the performance o f the private sector, but
nevertheless the state enterprises compete unfairly with those in the private
sector. And second, even if the role o f the state could be limited to activities
where its presence is required due to the lack of private interest, the
involvement o f the Revolutionary Party and even the Army in productive
activities complicates an
efficient assignment o f government
responsibilities. There would appear to be no economic justification for the
involvement o f the latter two institutions in the process o f service delivery
at all (except in the area of National Defense and Disaster Management
perhaps), let alone their role in productive activities, such as in the forestry
sector by the Army. It is apparent that there is currently little or no
conviction that the role o f the state should be limited to creating an enabling
environment for the development o f the private sector.
Local governments in Lao PDR play an important role in the provision
o f government services, as they are assigned the responsibility o f delivering
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key public services such as education, health services, agriculture and
infrastructure. The actual assignment o f expenditures partially follows the
subsidiarity principle and broadly coincides with standard principles of
expenditure assignment.12 However, the absence o f explicit expenditure
assignments for lower levels o f government at district and village levels
must be highlighted as an important shortcoming o f the current system. The
1994 State Budget Law leaves it to provincial governments to arrange all
expenditure assignments with districts and villages within their territories,
with very m inor exceptions. As we discussed in the earlier subsection, this
hierarchical approach to the vertical structure of government may
potentially threaten the efficient and uniform application o f best practices o f
fiscal decentralization, especially in the absence o f adequate accountability
mechanisms. Traditionally, these type o f hierarchical design, absent a
formal statement o f expenditure and revenue raising responsibilities for all
levels o f government, leads to unpredictability and instability in
intergovernmental fiscal relations (as no consistent expenditure and revenue
frameworks are provided for some subnational levels o f government).
Added to the perceived lack of monitoring and enforcement capacity o f
central and provincial administration, the potential result is a highly
inefficient system o f inter-governmental fiscal relations, prone to corrupt
practices and absent o f any kind o f political accountability.
Another important shortcoming o f expenditure assignments in Lao is
that the current assignment o f expenditure responsibilities in the local
government is vague. Importantly, the expenditure assignments fail to
consider the multi-dimensional nature o f expenditure assignments. The
Budget Law does not distinguish either between national functions that are
delegated for implementation to the subnational level (in a de-concentrated
fashion) and those functions that are truly own functions o f subnational
levels (in a decentralized fashion). A second issue is the lack o f clarification
o f expenditure assignments for concurrent or joint responsibilities, between
central and subnational governments on the one hand, and between different
levels o f subnational governments on the other; that is, the legislation does
not clarify who is supposed to be responsible for what in the case o f many
joint responsibilities (as can be seen in Table 6.1 below). A way to
introduce clarity in the case o f shared responsibilities is to be explicit in the
law about the distribution o f competencies for the regulation, the financing,
and the implementation o f each government function.
Ideally, this assignment o f expenditure responsibilities would be
sanctioned in Organic Laws for Provincial and District Governments or in
the Budget Law. However, in Lao PDR, the subnational levels o f
government do not have separate legal status (as separate from the central
government which embodies the State). This is an important legal limitation
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to the objective o f effectively rationalizing the roles and responsibilities of
the different levels o f government.
In order to account for heterogeneity and the different levels of
administrative capacity in each of the provinces and sub-provincial levels of
government, expenditure assignments could have asymmetric below the
provincial level, at district and village levels. However, in Lao like in other
single-party communist regimes, the authorities have favored one-size-fitsall approaches to the restructuring of the government institutions.
Traditionally it is also desirable to complement explicit expenditure
assignments with the strengthening o f institutions for intergovernmental
dialog and coordination,, especially between central government agencies
and the provinces.'3 However, to date there appears to exist little or no
communication in many areas. In fact, the nature o f the state in Lao PDR
limits the options available for the implementation o f these institutions of
dialogue and conflict resolution. Single-party transition states are
commonly developed along strongly hierarchical vertical structures o f
power, and subnational units nearly operate as fiefdoms, whereby
communication across sectors is rare and unstructured. A traditional
example at the central government level is the problem posed by the
separation of budgeting processes between the MOF (recurrent expenditure)
and the Committee for Planning and Investment (capital expenditure
budget). The lack o f coordination between these two agencies results in
operation and maintenance budgets that underestimate needs and are poorly
aligned with ongoing investment efforts. The all-mighty Party cadres are
usually, in a scenario o f a lack o f separation of powers, a last resort for all
conflict resolution. This unnecessarily slows down processes that would be
better left out to administrative coordinating committees and it inescapably
leads to the considerable concentration o f power that is currently placed
upon the highest political organs of the Revolutionary Party.
In summary, in addition to suffering from many common problems in
other decentralized countries related to the definition o f expenditure
assignments (e.g. vague and informal statements, lack of definition of
assignments for lower levels o f governments, no consideration o f the multi
faceted nature o f expenditure assignments, etc.), Lao PDR presents other
challenges particular to single-party communist states. Among the latter, the
services and roles played in the economic arena by the Revolutionary Party
and the Army rank as top limitations towards a modem definition o f
government and an efficient assignment of functions across government
levels.
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INSTITUTIONAL BA R RIER S: THE HOLLOWING-OUT OF
THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE
In the previous section we argued that the government o f Lao PDR is not
truly decentralized because no effective autonomy has been devolved to the
communities. Whatever decisions are made at the subnational level, they are
unlikely to incorporate the voice o f residents; in particular, the communities
are not able to elect their own representatives. In this context the
subnational authorities are not really accountable to their constituents, and
therefore the system would hardly be able to generate gains in efficiency
due to a better fit o f the preferences o f the community. This argument
suggests that the lack o f real decentralization is mainly (but not exclusively)
associated with the expenditure side o f the budget.
In this section we explain how the system has evolved into an
exaggerated de-concentrated fiscal structure where the center currently
lacks the ability to collect enough revenues and coordinate nationwide
expenditure policies. Although the de-concentrated scheme can be observed
in both the expenditure and the revenue side o f the budget, it is in the latter
where we find the most extreme features, posing the most serious obstacles
to moving forward with the decentralization process. In particular, our focus
is on the problems associated with revenue collections by the provincial tax
administration and customs.
The Assignment of Revenues and Administrative Functions
As we remarked already above, an advanced level o f de-concentration in the
public sector is usually considered as a positive foundation for a process of
fiscal decentralization because it is supposed to develop the administrative
and technical capabilities o f subnational governments, and thus facilitates
the transfer o f new expenditure and revenue responsibilities (Bahl and
Martinez-Vazquez, 2006). However, there are exceptions to that generally
accepted rule, and Lao PDR is an important one. The high degree o f de
concentration in Lao is one o f the main problems to be addressed in moving
forward to decentralize the current system o f intergovernmental fiscal
relations.
Several concerns about the inappropriate assignment o f revenues and
organization of tax administration have been raised in numerous studies and
also by multilateral agencies (Vaillancourt, 2001; and IMF, 2006). There
seems to be a widespread agreement about the need to strengthen the
authority o f the Ministry o f Finance by recentralizing the tax and customs
administration.14 However, there are additional factors slowing down the
reform process. Some o f these factors, related to the structure of
intergovernmental fiscal relations, will be addressed in the foil-

Table 6.1 Assignment o f Expenditure Responsibility in LAO PDR
C en tra l G o v ern m en t

Provin ces and C ities

D istricts and M un icip alities

V illages

Health

National health and
disease prevention
programs

Provincial and district
hospitals services

District and Municipal services as
assigned by provincial government

Implementation unit

Education

National program
Educational instruments

Provincial services
Primary and secondary
program

District and Municipal services as
assigned by provincial government

Implementation unit
(school construction,
and assignment of
teacher)

Economic Activities

Services managed
centrally

Provincial and district
services

District and Municipal services as
assigned by provincial government

Implementation unit

Culture and Sports

International and state
level movement and
performances

Sports and cultural
performances at local levels

District and Municipal services as
assigned by provincial government

Implementation unit

Social

National programs
State Pension programs

Provincial and district
services

District and Municipal services as
assigned by provincial government

Implementation unit

Defense

National defense

Local defense and security

District and Municipal services as
assigned by provincial government

Implementation unit

Police and Security

National police and
official forces

Provincial and district police
and security

District and Municipal services as
assigned by provincial government

Implementation unit

Political Organs

National party and central
level agencies

Provincial and district
political organs

District and Municipal political
organs

Implementation unit

Table 6 .1 Assignment o f Expenditure Responsibility in LAO PDR (continued)
C en tra l G o v ern m en t

P rovin ces and C ities
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Prices Subsidies

Central programs

Provincial and district
services and programs

interest

Overseas and national
debt service

Debt services on programs
that benefited Provincial and
district levels

Other Expenditure

Disaster, disease and
poverty relief

Capital expenditures

T ransfers

D istricts and M u n icip alities

V illages

District and Municipal services as
assigned by provincial government

n/a

n/a

n/a

Disaster, disease and
poverty relief

District and Municipal services as
assigned by provincial government

n/a

Centrally managed
Infrastructure projects

Provincial and district
infrastructure management

District and Municipal
infrastructure as assigned by
provincial government

Transfer to subnational
governments

Transfer to Provincial and
district and municipalities

District and Municipal services as
assigned by provincial government

Implementation unit

n/a

Source: Martinez-Vazquez, Gomez and Yao (2005), compiled from Decree 192/PM (Prime Minister decree on the implementation o f the 1994 Budget Law)
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owing discussion, while other institutional and political factors are
discussed in the last section o f this chapter.
Provincial governments in Lao are assigned some sources o f own
revenues that roughly meet the best international practices. However,
provincial governments are also responsible for administering and
collecting some taxes assigned to the central government, notably those
defined as shared revenues with the local governments, like the turnover or
value-added tax, excise taxes and the corporate profit taxes.15 These sources
o f revenues represent around 30 percent o f total revenues at the local and
central levels (see Table 6.2). Additionally, provincial governments are in
charge of collecting all import duties, the natural resource tax, and the
tim ber royalties. In total, around the 60 percent o f overall government
revenue are collected at the subnational level, while a relatively weak
central government tax administration focuses almost exclusively on the
group of large taxpayers. Indeed, out o f a total 1,180 employees for the
entire tax administration in the country in 2006, only 43 were located at
headquarters (World Bank, 2007).
The performance o f the tax administration is limited also by the absence
o f modern administrative procedures and updated technological
improvements, as well as by the low technical capacity and expertise o f its
personnel. The resultant lack of capacity for the monitoring and
enforcement o f tax regulations leads to opaque practices that may likely
increase the costs o f compliance and reduce tax collections. In this context
it is not surprising that the overall tax revenue performance o f the tax
administration is very low. It has been estimated that the central and
provincial tax departments currently collect only around 30 percent o f all
revenues that could have been collected (Martinez-Vazquez, Gomez and
Yao, 2006). What complicates matters further is that the assignment of
administrative responsibilities over revenue collections is in practice
defined in accordance to the type or location o f the taxpayers not to the
different tax instruments. The same tax instrument can therefore be assigned
to different levels o f government, adding complexity in the system and
reducing the potential gains from economies o f scale in tax administration.
The Power of Provincial Administrations and the Distortion of
Incentives for Revenue Mobilization
Many o f the problems associated with the collections o f government
revenues in Lao PDR are associated with the excessive power embodied in
provincial administrations and particularly on the governors. In the context
o f the New Economic Mechanism (NEM) introduced in 1986 the provinces
were given a great deal o f authority regarding the collection of

Table 6.2 Composition o f Local and Central Revenues, period 2004-2005
Total

Central own-revenues:

Local own-revenues:

Revenues
(Million
Kip)

Revenues
(Million
Kip)

Share on
local
revenues
(%)

Share on
local
revenues
(%)
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67,553

2.4

Turnover taxes
(collected by Customs)

490,231

17.8

8.0

Import duties

444,350

16.1

4.3

Overflight fees

221,763

8.0
7.7

Income taxes

228,307

23.1

Other fees

109,621

11.1

Natural resource
duties

79,373

Royalties

42,797

Fees

37,545

3.8

Timber royalties

212,131

Land tax

27,618

2.8

Amortization

130,015

4.7

Excise tax
(collected by Customs)

124,714

4.5

308,927

11.2

1.999,684

72.5

Others

125,459

12.7

Others

Total local
own-revenues

650,720

65.8

Total central
own-revenues

Revenues
(Million
Kip)

Share on
local
revenues (%)

2,650,404

70.7

Table 6.2 Composition o f Local and Central Revenues, period 2004-2005(continued)
Shared revenues:
Revenues
(Million
Kip)

Share on
local
revenues
(%)

Revenues
(Million
Kip)

Share on
local
revenues
(%)

Revenues
(Million
Kip)

Share on
local
revenues (%)
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Turnover tax-Tax
Department

180,223

18.2

161,342

5.8

341,565

9.1

Profit taxes

131,278

13.3

196,011

7.1

327,289

8.7

Excise-Tax
Department

13,685

1.4

226,211

8.2

239,896

6.4

Revenue on
SOEs dividend

5,394

0.5

171,953

6.2

177,347

4.7

Minimum tax

8,092

0.8

4,072

0.1

12,164

0.3

Total local
shared-revenues

338,672

34.2

759,589

27.5

1,098,261

29.3

Total revenues

489,392

100.0

2,759,273

100.0

3,748.666

100.0

Source: Ministry o f Finance, Lao PDR

Total central
shared-revenues
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revenues, including those o f the central government, and were even allowed
to set the interest rates and exchange rates at the provincial branches o f the
State Bank. This atypical arrangement, which has been only partially
corrected, has the potential o f severely complicating the macroeconomic
and monetary policies at the national level, and provides poor incentives to
the financial administration o f the provinces.
Under the current system, the central government defines revenue
targets and expenditure limits for each province. In theory, the excess o f
revenue collections (over the targets) are supposed to be transferred to the
center. In the case the revenue targets are not reached, the transfers to the
central governments are still expected to be made, while the adjustment
should be done solely in the level o f provincial expenditures. In practice,
however, these rules are not applied, and collections under the target only
imply a reduction o f the transfers to the center, exactly the opposite o f what
the law prescribes. Moreover, if actual collections are higher than the target,
a 50 percent o f the excess can be kept in the province to finance capital
expenditures.
Although this set o f rules is clearly conceived to impose budgetary
discipline and encourage revenue collections, its actual effects might be
very different. On the one hand, the expenditure limitations are not credible
constraints and can potentially be manipulated by the central government in
order to maximize its own revenues. On the other hand, increasing
revenuecollections locally is less attractive when the gains must be shared
with the central government. And even worse, given the weak tax
administration at the central level, a very rational alternative for the
provincial administrations consists simply in declaring fewer revenues
formally and shift some to extra-budgetary accounts or let domestic-local
companies pay less in central taxes. All these seem to have been common
practices among subnational governments.
As an attempt to overcome these shortcomings the Instruction 2372 of
the Ministry o f Finance, issued in 2005, established a fee-based bonus
system for revenue collections that awards local authorities and line
ministries with a 0.7 percent o f the total amount o f custom revenues and a
1.5 percent of the amount collected from state properties, land tax and
certain fees. This type o f solution, however, has not been effective in
solving the revenue problem and correcting the structural deficiencies o f the
system.
The setting o f expenditure limits and revenue targets is supposed to
follow transparent and simple methodologies based on historical
performance and subject to marginal adjustments due to changes in policies
and regulations. But again, the actual practice differs from the original
intention o f the Law. Both the expenditure limits and revenue targets are not
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necessarily set with strict attention to the technical criteria but rather
defined in a bargaining process between the central government and the
provincial authorities during the budget elaboration.
The political unwritten aspects o f the budgetary process have been
routinely exacerbated by mutual allegations. While the central government
is accused o f underestimating subnational expenditure needs and setting
unrealistic revenue targets, the subnational authorities are accused of
concealing revenue collections and overestimating their expenditure needs.
From an institutional point of view, economic management agencies of
the State suffer strong pressure to show significant growth in a series of
“national-importance” indicators, such as GDP and revenue growth. Absent
substantial changes to the tax system, budget planning is left to inaccurate
estimates of economic growth and the tax base to justify the desired
increases in revenue growth (World Bank, 2007). Subsequently, the
unrealistic revenue estimates provide the platform for non-sustainable
expenditure patterns.
There may be yet another perverse incentive for the definition of
unrealistic revenue targets. It is assumed that provinces report only a
fraction o f the revenues collected on behalf of the central government.
Higher revenue targets may have been thought to provide a stimulus to
improved disclosure o f collection, but the lack o f capacity to enforce
sanctions (in the form o f obligatory lower expenditure if revenue targets are
not met) water down the debatable strength of this incentive. In fact, even
though the subnational governments are supposed to deposit the collection
o f fees in the provincial governments’ treasury accounts, this requirement is
not always met and a portion of the collections are deviated to alternative
accounts and sometimes simply “lost” and never reported.
In any case, the bargaining power o f the provinces is substantial, and
depends not only on the fact that they control an important share o f the
central government revenues, but also on the legal provisions defined by the
Law on Local Administration. In its Article 14, paragraphs 12-14, the
governor is granted with an important degree of discretion in appointing and
removing most o f the positions at the subnational level, including those of
de-concentrated national agencies like tax administration and the Treasury.
The provincial administration is also paying the salaries o f all public
servants, thus in practice the governor can exercise firm control over the
central government personnel in the province.
The Consequences of the Excessive Revenue De-concentration
Given the natural asymmetries in the ability to collect revenues, the lack of
centralized coordination and control can be expected to exacerbate
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inequalities among subnational governments. Vientiane municipality, for
instance, collects much more revenues than the rest o f the provinces, and in
general a great variation in revenue collections can be observed at this level
o f government. Another factor contributing to fiscal inequalities is the
subnational collection o f central revenues whose derivation is erratically
distributed across the country, like the import duties, which in practice can
be retained only by those provinces where the collection takes place.
These inequalities are difficult to reverse. But more importantly, the
current system does not provide the mechanisms to ensure an equitable and
efficient allocation of the available resources. As explained, the use of
expenditure limits and revenue targets -w hich are also the foundations of
the main program o f intergovernmental transfers in Lao PDR, is not
working properly. This system has led to the non transparent and
unpredictable financing o f all levels o f government and it does not provide a
sound rationale for the distribution o f available resources. In short, the
current system is not properly addressing the vertical and horizontal
inequalities associated with the existence o f certain degree o f autonomy at
the subnational level.
This outcome is partly the result o f a poorly designed system o f the
intergovernmental fiscal relations, but it might also be understood as an
endogenous factor imposing perverse incentives to the government
authorities at every level. For instance, even though the subnational
administrations are, legally speaking, mere de-concentrated governmental
units without autonomous legal standing, the lack of adequate control
mechanisms implies that they are not truly accountable to the center. Since
the system is virtually disassembled and unable to ensure fairness or
efficiency gains to all participants, then every actor is virtually compelled to
extract selfishly all the benefits that can possibly obtain from it.
As explained before, there is a widespread agreement about the need of
re-centralizing some key dimensions o f the fiscal management, mainly
through the strengthening o f the Ministry o f Finance and in particular the
Treasury function. But so far the reforms have been slow and have not lead
to a sound structure in intergovernmental fiscal relations. A strong central
government with the ability to monitor and evaluate the progress of the
several components o f the system is a necessary condition for the
implementation o f a sound fiscal decentralization reform (Bahl, 1999).
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POLITICAL BA RRIERS: THE CH ALLENGES OF SINGLE
PA RTY SY ST E M S
With the new constitution o f 1991, a unicameral National Assembly
composed o f 115 representatives was created in Lao PDR. The members to
the Assembly are elected for a period o f five years from a list prepared by
the People’s Revolutionary Party. In recent years, “properly screened”
independents have been allowed to run for the Assembly; however, in the
last election of 2006, only two o f the delegates elected were classified as
independents (CIA 2008). The National Assembly has been criticized for
representing little more than a legislative “rubber-stamp” institution that
sanctions the political proposals channeled from the party and through the
executive. The overlap between the Party and the Army is also substantial,
with six out o f the 11 members o f the Politburo (the highest political organ
within the Party) being current or former members o f the Army.
The reform o f the current structure o f central-provincial fiscal relations
will thus face significant barriers due to the political “status-quo”. In order
to move towards sound fiscal decentralization arrangements, the extensive
fiscal powers o f Provincial Governors would have to be vested upon a
provincial legislative body elected by citizens. This would ensure the proper
accountability o f Provincial Governments and the matching o f expenditure
decisions to local preferences. One would expect arduous resistance on the
part o f the powerful group of Governors to a change of this kind. The power
and autonomy given to the Governors has allowed them to develop relations
o f patronage with the local elites in the historical Laotian way, reinforcing
what may resemble some sort o f a political constituency. Institutional
resistance should also be expected from the Revolutionary Party, as any
move towards further decentralization that does not include the
implementation o f elected councils would extend its power. Currently, local
representatives are Party members and represent the interests of the Party,
not necessarily o f their supposed local constituencies. Thus, the required
political link allowing the preferences o f citizens to be reflected in
expenditure decisions via the accountability o f their representatives has
been absent.
Moreover, the Central Government capacity to directly appoint
Governors - capacity, it can be assumed, adequately sanctioned by the
Revolutionary Party - accords an element o f political control to the
President and the Party that may not be easily surrendered. Similarly, heads
o f the district administrations are appointed by the Provincial Governors,
again endowing them with an important instrument o f control o f sub
provincial units o f government. The transition experience o f Vietnam,
highly regarded in Lao as a critical reference, may however allow
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considering the creation o f representative institutions at the subnational
level. In Vietnam, Provincial People’s Councils directly elected by the
population are increasingly important in the determination o f subnational
fiscal structures.
The overlap between the Party and the Executive, and the Party and the
Army are considerable, and usually the highest ranking bureaucrats and
politicians are also serving or former army officers. The ranks are filled
with veterans from the Revolutionary struggle that brought the Party to
power and who view any kind o f reform that may limit the power o f the
Party and the Army with extreme reticence (Stuart-Fox, 2005). From that
perspective, the restructuring o f central-provincial fiscal relations, including
the re-allocation o f sources o f revenue to the central level or the proposed
increased monitoring capacity required for the Ministry o f Finance would
alter very substantially the current balance o f power.
This re-organization o f intergovernmental relations along the best
practices o f fiscal decentralization would also pose a significant threat to the
control o f state-owned enterprises by the Party and the Army. The presence
o f the latter is particularly important in the forestry sector, including the
exploitation o f timber and related industries. These state owned enterprises,
as it is the case in other Revolutionary regimes and in particular in the
neighboring Vietnam, have traditionally represented a significant source o f
income for the Army. The re-assignment of revenues to a central tax office
would directly impinge upon the freedom with which the Army has
managed these industries. On the other hand, efficiency gains and improved
control o f funds may be obtained from assigning qualified tax officials to
the supervision and taxation o f those industries. But, of course, the central
tax office may be subject to political pressures as well.
The successful reform o f intergovernmental fiscal relations will require
a political champion that leads the debate and maintains it at the forefront of
the development topics. It is far from clear at the present time who that
champion may be. To a certain extent, multiparty systems allow for a
greater multiplicity o f positions and the emergence of leaders in different
political areas. Within a single party system, however, being labeled as a
"reformist” without having ensured sufficient political backing may be the
more direct ticket to political oblivion. There are no alternative political
outlets in single-party systems. No “exit” options in Hirschman’s (1970)
terminology. Thus, altering the political equilibrium typically require long
processes o f debate, external events that open political windows o f
opportunity, and extreme political valor to advocate for reform. Under these
conditions, the emergence o f political decentralization champions is made
more unlikely. However, the current political leadership may be open to the
“testing” o f some reforms on a piloting basis, similar to the approach that
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China has quite successfully adopted for now several decades. But a strong
case needs to be made that those reforms can bring substantial benefits to
Lao. That case is being built if ever so slowly by the interaction o f the
international donor community and upper echelon bureaucrats at the
Ministry o f Finance. As social demands for further democratization mount,
as has been the case in China and Vietnam, the party will need to consider
avenues for political participation that allow channeling citizen’s demands,
either in the form o f non-governmental organizations or some form o f local
elections.
Grassroots participation and demands for devolution is another element
o f the political process that could bring decentralization reform. Local
participation, either directly channeled through elections or via the work of
civil society, is an important counter balance to the state that increases the
accountability o f government. However, there are presently substantial
barriers to this process taking hold. In Lao PDR the operations o f non
governmental organizations so prevalent in western countries are not
allowed, and the existing grassroots organizations are mostly satellite
organizations o f the Revolutionary Party.
Some observers have also pointed to certain cultural traits of the Laotian
society which may allow the perpetuation of an obviously unbalanced
system o f representation in which the interests o f the population at large are
subject to the designs o f the Revolutionary Party and by extension, the
Provincial Governors. These observers have argued that the Buddhist
predominant culture in Lao, which focuses on human spiritual development
in contrast to materialistic achievements, fosters a certain alienation o f the
population of Lao PDR from the political process and the practices o f its
rulers. Aware o f the formidable challenges to the development o f the
country, and in particular of the constraints the current de-concentrated
structure o f government poses to fiscal reforms, Buddhists’ beliefs may
quiet the demands for long-awaited reforms.

CONCLUSIONS
Lao PDR is a small poor country but with significant cultural and ethnic
diversity and a large and inefficient public sector. Lo and behold, the
potential for sustained economic development lies on larger investments in
human capital, via social service expenditures in education and health, and
physical infrastructure. Against this background, Lao confronts a tight fiscal
resources envelope that underlines the need to improve the efficiency of
both public expenditure and revenue collection. Fiscal decentralization
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reform has the potential o f improving the overall efficiency o f the public
sector and to allow the country to advance on the path o f sustained growth.
In many important ways, the central government in Lao is fiscally too
weak to command the resources and institutional leadership required to
foster decentralization reforms. From the revenue side, the tax
administration and customs service remain largely under the control o f the
provincial governments, and from the expenditure side, the central
government authorities lack the means, such as a centralized Treasury
function, to control actual disbursements at any level.
Addressing the reform o f the current system o f inter-governmental fiscal
relations in Lao PDR demands a clear and well-sequenced medium-term
government strategy and implementation plan that is widely agreed and
supported by the political establishment, and championed by the highest
political leaders. Any future shorter term (or stop gap) measures would have
to be consistent with the reform outlined in this medium-term strategy.
Importantly, the strategy would require a refinement and clarification of
the current assignments o f expenditure responsibilities, and the definition
and quantification o f budget expenditure norms that provide an adequate
system o f estimation o f expenditure needs at subnational levels o f
government. Additionally, the centralization of the Treasury system, already
in process o f evaluation, is a critical piece in the strategy to accord the
central government the monitoring and enforcement capacity it requires to
lead an efficient process o f fiscal decentralization. Also, a fine tuning o f tax
assignments along economic efficiency lines is required to allow improving
the accountability and fiscal responsibility o f all levels o f government.
Along those lines, the re-centralization of the tax administration would
assist critically in endowing the central government with the fiscal prowess
required to re-structure the financing system o f local governments. That
would include the implementation o f transfer mechanisms that do not rely
on faulty collection incentives, but on an adequate definition on expenditure
needs and fiscal capacities.
However, the current institutional setup, which displays an extreme
degree o f inefficient de-concentration and a lack o f democratic institutions
that ensure public accountability, make the chances for successful
decentralization reform pretty slim. The political and institutional forces
that were behind the design o f the current system largely remain in place.
As with any other single-party state, the rigid control o f the political thought
by the ruling elite limits the consideration o f alternatives for the vertical
structure o f government that increase the political accountability o f
subnational government representatives. It is difficult to envision in the
short-term the rising o f a champion for decentralization reform. However,
economic pressures and the need to develop may lead the current regime to
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experiment with some forms o f fiscal decentralization reforms. There is
significant interest within the government to imitate to certain extent the
successful reforms that have taken hold in neighboring Vietnam. This and
the nudging forward o f the international donor community may still produce
some significant progress in the immediate horizon.
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We are thankful to Balakrishna Menon for helpful comments on an earlier version of the
chapter.
The Gini value is similar of that of India for example, and higher than the rate reported by
Indonesia (UNDP, 2008).
Vietnam’s experience with its 2000 Enterprise Law, which significantly simplified
enterprise registration procedures, is being held as a best practice in the region and a model
o f reference for initiatives in this area for Lao PDR.
As explained further below, the vertical system o f governance in Lao PDR should more
properly be designated as a de-concentrated system, as opposed to a decentralized system.
Similarly, using the term "subnational levels o f government" may be misleading as the
territorial units arc integral (de-concentrated) parts of the central government, without
separate legal standing. However, because of the current high degree o f de-concentration,
especially decision-making autonomy, these territorial units will be loosely referred to in
this report as subnational governments and the entire system as the decentralization system.
See UNCDF (2002) for further discussion.
Similar patterns of geographical self-sufficiency develop during Mao’s long march in China
or Vietnam’s war of independence.
There are other signs that the provincial governors' power can be reigned in. For example,
the Ministry o f Finance holds the power to issue orders to correct governors’ fiscal policies.
However, the enforcement o f this authority seems to be more the problem, as governors are
granted also ministerial rank.
This includes one prefecture (Vientiane, the capital city) and one special zone (Saysomboun,
Special zone)
Although it is not accorded official recognition, districts group villages for administrative
purposes into zones or "khcts" (UNCDF, 2002). There are other administrative units without
separate budgetary standing; these are 4 Urban Development Administrative Authorities
(UDAAs) and the Vientiane UDAA (VUDAA).
The principle o f “dual subordination" of subnational public personnel is a characteristic trait
o f the Soviet budgeting system. Although a priori it appears to be convenient, in practice
dual subordination has failed to work well in many other countries that in the past have used
or today continue to use a Soviet budgeting approach. The main reason is that both
theoretically and in practice it is not possible for public employees to respond to two
different bosses. When there is conflict of interest between the two bosses, as there always is
in any public administration, public employees by force have to respond to only one of
them. Other institutions and incentives, such as physical proximity or who ultimately
appoints and fires and who pays for salaries and other benefits determine which authority
actually controls subnational employees.
In addition, it would not make much sense to eliminate either the provinces or the districts
for historical and all sorts of practical reasons.
The subsidiarity principle stipulates that the responsibility for the provision of goods and
services should be placed at the lowest level o f government, (i.e., compatible with the
smallest benefit area of the service), that is able to deliver the good or service in an efficient
manner.
Even with an explicit and clear statement o f expenditure responsibilities, it is generally
impossible to make provisions, in the law, for all possible situations encountered in delivery
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14.
15.

of services. Rather than introducing more and more details and complexities in the law, one
effective way to deal with these additional uncertainties is to create or strengthen institutions
of coordination among agencies at different levels o f government that share a particular
expenditure responsibility. For example, holding regular meetings and providing
information at all levels facilitates coordination for clarifying an effective assignment of
expenditure responsibilities.
See, for instance, Martinez-Vazquez, Gomez and Yao (2005); and World Bank (2007,
2008).
Article 16 of the National Budget Law Implementing Decree, February 2008.
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